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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
vs. : 
LAWRENCE H. ALLMENDINGER, : Case No. 14582 
Defendant-Appellant 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case is an appeal from the Third District Court, in 
which the defendant was convicted by plea of guilty to the charge 
of unlawful possession of a controlled substance. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
After being placed on probation, the appellant was ordered 
to show cause as to why his probation should not be revoked. Appellant 
moved to dismiss the Order to Show Cause on the grounds that the Court 
lacked jurisdiction to revoke appellant's probation. The court 
denied the motion. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks an order of this Court dismissing the Order 
to Show Cause and discharging him from the custody of the Third 
District Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 2, 1975 appellant entered a plea of not guilty in the 
District Court of the Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, to an information charging him with Unlawful 
Distribution for Value of a Controlled Substance (R.2-3). On 
June 2, 1975 appellant entered a plea of guilty to the lesser and 
included offense in the information of Unlawful Possession of a Con-
trolled Substance, which under Utah Code Annotated §58-37-8(2)(b)(i) 
(as amended 1972), carries a penalty of not more than $299 or imprison-
ment in the county jail for not more than six months. (R.9) 
On June 9, 1975, the Court suspended imposition of sentence 
and placed the appellant on probation for one year. (R.10) 
On March 4, 1976, Judge Bryant H. Croft signed an order 
requiring the defendant to appear and show cause why his probation 
should not be revoked. (R. 11) This order came almost nine months 
after the order placing appellant on probation. 
On March 17, 1976, counsel for appellant filed a motion to 
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction (R.29) and on March 30, 1976 the 
Court heard arguments on the motion (R.30). Both sides submitted 
memoranda and the Court, by memorandum decision of April 19, 1976, 
denied appellant's motion. It is this decision from which appellant 
pursues this appeal. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WHERE THERE IS NO STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR EXTENDING A 
PROBATIONARY PERIOD BEYOND THE MAXIMUM LIMITS FOR AN 
OFFENSE, THE COURT RETAINS JURISDICTION FOR ONLY THE 
PERIOD OF THE MAXIMUM SENTENCE AND CANNOT THEREAFTER 
TERMINATE THE PROBATION. 
Utah Code Annotated §77-35-17, (1953) authorizes Utah courts 
to stay imposition or execution of a criminal sentence but does not 
specify the length of time for which a commitment may be stayed and the 
person placed on probation. Other than short stays for specified 
purposes, the only stays contemplated are those under that statute, 
which provides: 
"Upon a plea of guilty or conviction of any crime or offense, 
if it appears compatible with the public interest, the court 
having jurisdiction may suspend the imposition or the execution 
of sentence and may place the defendant on probation for such 
period of time as the court shall determine. 
The court may subsequently increase or decrease the probation 
period, and may revoke or modify any condition of probation. 
While on probation, the defendant may be required to pay, in 
one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time being placed 
on probation; may be required to make restitution or reparation 
to the aggrieved party or parties for the actual damages or 
losses caused by the offense to which the defendant has 
pleaded guilty or for which conviction was had; and may be 
required to provide for the support of his wife or others 
for whose support he may be legally liable. Where it appears 
to the court from the report of the probation agent in charge 
of the defendant, or otherwise, that the defendant has 
complied with the conditions of such probation, the court 
may if it be compatible with the public interest either 
upon motion of the district attorney or of its own motion 
terminate the sentence or set aside the plea of guilty or 
conviction of the defendant, and dismiss the action and 
discharge the defendant." 
1. McPhie v. Turner, 10 Utah 2d 237, P.2d 91 (1960). 
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The Utah Supreme Court has not ruled directly on the issue 
of whether a court may impose probation for a period longer than the 
maximum sentence allowed. There is ample authority from other 
jurisdictions, however, in support of Defendant's contention that 
where the statute authorizing probation fails to specify the 
maximum period of probation to which a person may be subjected, the 
maximum period allowed is the maximum sentence of imprisonment which 
could have been imposed. The general rule is stated in 21 Am. Jur. 
2d Criminal Law §555: 
"Where the suspension of imposition of sentence is 
authorized, the court does not lose jurisdiction 
of the case and it may, after such suspension pronounce 
sentence at any time provided the maximum period for 
which sentence could have been imposed or probation 
granted has not elapsed.T< (emphasis added) . 
The most recent pronouncement on the issue comes from the 
New Mexico Court of Appeals in State v. Lard, 86 N.M. 71, 519 P.2d 
307 (1974). In Lard the defendant attacked the propriety of the 
enhanced sentence directed by the lower court. Under New Mexico 
law a sentence may be enhanced according to a specific statute providing 
for such due to defendant's prior record. Defendant contended that 
the enhancement provision was improperly applied. The court decided 
against the defendant on this issue but stated in dicta the general 
rule that . . . n 
"The total length of a deferred or staspended sentence, or 
the time served on parole, cannot exceed the maximum authorized 
sentence for the crime invoTved.1 (emphasis added) 519 P. 2d at 
The Idaho Supreme Court had considered the identical question 
presented there in Ex Parte Medley, 73 Idaho 474, 253 P.2d 794 (1953). 
In that case, the court was dealing with a statute 
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similar to Utah Code Annotated, §77-35-17. The Idaho statute 
provided: 
"Whenever any person shall have been convicted or enter a 
plea of guilty in any District Court of this State of Idaho, 
of or to any crime against the Laws of the State, except 
those of treason or murder, the court may in its discretion, 
commute the sentence, confine the defendants in the county 
jail, or if the defendant is of proper age in the State 
Industrial School, suspend the execution of the judgment, or 
withhold judgment on such terms and for such time as it may 
prescribe and may put the defendant on probation in charge of 
some proper person selected and designated by this court for 
that purpose and make such orders related thereto as the court 
in its sound discretion deems necessary and expedient." 
(emphasis added) Idaho Code §19-2601, 
(as amended 1949). 
Notwithstanding statutory language allowing the court to order 
probation for "such time as it may prescribe11 (identical to Utah's 
statute), the Idaho Supreme Court stated at 799: 
"The period of probation could have been for the maximum 
period for which petitioner might have been imprisoned 
or for a lesser, but not for a greater period. 
(emphasis added) 253 P.2d at 800. 
The Idaho Supreme Court recently reaffirmed Ex Parte Medley 
in its holding in State v. Sandoval, 92 Idaho 853, 452 P.2d 350 (1969). 
In Sandoval appellant argued that one condition of probation 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment. In dismissing the 
Appellant's contention the court noted prior holdings concerning 
probation and stated: 
"The period of probation may last as long as the maximum 
period for which defendant might have been imprisoned." 
452 P.2d at 358. 
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The Supreme Court of Kansas had also ruled that a judge may 
parole persons as he sees fit but he has no power to extend the 
conditions of the parole beyond the term of the sentence which 
could have been imposed. The Court held In re Carroll, 91 Kan. 
395, 137 P.975 (1914) that where petitioners had been sentenced 
to six months in jail (the maximum penalty) and placed on parole 
by the sentencing judge for two years, the judge was not authorized 
to extend the term of parole beyond a maximum sentence. In language 
oft-quoted since this 1914 decision, the court stated: 
"But is there no limit to the period of parole? Can it have 
been the purpose of the legislature that a police judge, 
having imposed a sentence of imprisonment for ten days, 
can issue a parole upon the condition that the paroled person 
shall be under surveillance for ten years, or even longer and 
subject to be committed at any time for a violation of parole? 
It is true the statute provides that the parole shall be 
granted upon such conditions as the police judge may see fit 
to impose, but the view of the court is that it was not the 
legislative intent that the parole period might be 
indefinitely extended . . . Although the statute. . . does 
not expressly declare a limit, one is doubtless contemplated 
and, since provision is made for imprisonment, that should 
be regarded as the limit of time for the termination of a 
parole and the absolute discharge of the paroled person. It 
is argued that a parole is a matter of grace and discretion 
but could it be regarded as a gracious act to hold over the 
head of a convicted person the unexecuted sentence for a lifetin 
with the uncertainty that he might be recommitted to prison 
without notice at any time when the police judge chose to 
order it? 137 P. at 977. 
In a situation similar to the case at: bar, the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court ruled in 1925 that a judgment could be suspended only 
for the length of time of the maximum sentence. In Ex Parte Eaton, 
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29 0. Cr. 275 233 P. 781 (1925) the Court was dealing with a statute 
similar to the Utah statute presently in issue. The Oklahoma statute 
did not specify a period for which a person's sentence could be 
suspended in lieu of probation or parole. The statute stated only 
that at any time during "pendency of the judgment11 the stay could be 
revoked. The Court held that the judgment was only pending for 
the maximum period for which the person could be sentenced because: 
"It was certainly not the intention of the lawmakers to hold the 
sentence over the head of a person paroled so long as he should 
live . . . " 233 P. at 782. 
Although some states by statute allow periods longer than the 
term of possible imprisonment, those states h^ve some maximum stated 
and do not tolerate revocation after the maxitnum| e.g. Coleman v. Davis 
106 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 1958). Further, where the judge fails to specify 
the period in those jurisdictions, it has been generally held to be for 
the maximum period for which the person could be sentenced. Coleman, 
supra; People ex rel. Berman v. Marsden, 162 N.Y.S. 993 (1957). For 
example, in Commonwealth v. Duff, 192 A. 2d 258 (Pa. 1963), the court 
stated: 
therefore, when the court suspends the imposition of 
sentence without fixing terms of probation, it may, for 
proper reasons impose a prison sentence . . . if it does 
so within the maximum term which could have been imposeT^ 
for the offenseT (emphasis added) 192 A.2d at 261-62. 
" . . . [W]e have considered such a suspension as 
containing an implied probation for the maximum period 
for which defendant could have been sentenced . . . " 
(emphasis added) 192 A.2d at 261. 
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Similar holdings emerge from California, In People v. Blakeman 
170 Ca. 2d 596,339 P.2d 202 (1959) the District Court of Appeals, 
First District, Division 1 held that a revocation occurring eight 
months after probation was granted was invalid because it occurred 
after the maximum probationary period allowable. In Blakeman the 
defendant could have been sentenced to a maximum of six months. 
The Court there stated: 
"Here, no period of probation was specified in the order 
granting it. Accordingly, the six months maximum period 
of punishment (Pen. Code, Section 243) became the period 
of probation. In re Herron, 217 Cal. 400, 405, 19 P.2d 4; 
In re Goetz, 46 Cal. App. 2d 848, 851, 117 P.2d 47; 
People y.Theeley, 159 Cal. App. 2d 578, 581, 324 P.2d 65. 
Plaintiff argues that when the court imposed a sentence of one 
year (excessive by six months) and immediately suspended it, 
the court indicated an intent to give probation for one 
year. We are not persuaded, particularly in view of the 
established principle that when the probationary period is not 
specified it is deemed to be for the maximum possible period 
of imprisonment." 339 P.2d at 204. 
The Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah has considered the question three times previously in 
Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus. In Juliette Harris v. Dewey Fillip 
Case No. 187877, (1969) the petitioner alleged that the court lost 
jurisdiction over her after six months, the maximum sentence she could 
have been given for the offense committed. The case file contains 
no findings of fact or conclusions of law, however the record of 
actions indicates that the Writ was granted by Judge M.C. Faux on 
July 18, 1969. (See appendix A). 
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In a second case, Charles Franklin Himes v. Delmar Larson, 
Civil No. 188585 (1969), petitioner alleged that the court that 
had revoked his probation was without jurisdiction to do so. Judge 
Gordon R. Hall granted the Writ on September 9, 1969, signing conclusioi 
of law stating that at the time of revocation of petitioner's 
probation, the court lacked jurisdiction over him. (See appendix B). 
In the third case, Elizabeth Ann Smith v. Salt Lake City Court, 
Civil No. 227320 (1975), the City Court had revoked petitioner's 
probation. Judge Stewart M. Hansen, Sr. granted the Writ and made 
conclusions of law stating that the maximum length of probation 
could not exceed the maximum period of incarceration allowable for the 
offense. (See appendix C). 
Judge Bryant H. Croft's memorandum opinion in the instant 
matter places him in the minority among Third District judges on this 
issue. Although this writer has nothing but the highest respect 
for Judge Croft, his decision overlooks the case law and more pursuasive 
arguments on the subject presented in this brief and accepted by his 
colleagues. Judge Croft bases his denial of appellant's decision on 
two grounds:* 
(1) That in misdemeanor cases the maximum period of imprisonmen* 
is usually so short that a probationary period of the same length 
would be useless and therefore judges would give jail sentences where 
probation would otherwise be proper; and 
2. See Judge Croft's Memorandum Opinion R. 74-78 
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(2) That the problem in (1) above is accentuated where a 
defendant pleads guilty to a lesser offense after having been 
charged with a greater offense. 
Appellant believes it is extremely difficult for any one 
judge to determine just how long a period of probation is necessary 
to rehabilitate an offender. While it would seem likely that a first 
offender would need a lesser period than a repeat offender, such is 
not necessarily the case. Appellant agrees that a judge must 
be able to have the flexibility to deal with offenders on a 
case-by-case basis. To this extent, §77-35-17 grants the court 
the power to increase or decrease the probation period or to revoke 
or modify any condition of probation. Appellant sees this 
flexibility as essential to the rehabilitative process, however, such 
power must be guided by a maximum limit to the period of probation. 
Several states have recognized this and enacted statutes specifically 
limiting the probation period, as discussed earlier. In some states 
where no limits are prescribed, courts have placed the statutory 
maximum for incarceration as the limit for probation. (See e. g. 
State v. Lard, supra and State v. Sandoval, supra. ) 
Although it may well be true that some defendants cannot be 
rehabilitated within statutory maximums for misdemeanors, isn't it 
also true that the statutory maximum for imprisonment may not 
be long enough to alter a defendant's course of criminal conduct? 
All lawyers dealing with criminal cases are familiar with offenders 
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who have been imprisoned for statutory maximums in misdemeanor cases 
and then convicted again for other offenses. We may very well 
argue that a six month jail sentence is not enough time to 
rehabilitate or punish, but the important thing is that our 
legislature has fixed a maximum period of incarceration for both 
misdemeanor and felony offenses. The principle involved in probation 
periods is parallel. Although we may not be sure a statutory 
maximum sentence for imprisonment is a long enough limit for probation, 
our legislature has classified crimes by placing limits on penalties 
for those crimes. Just as some crimes are more serious than others, 
requiring longer maximum sentences, so too this distinction exists 
in the concept of rehabilitating persons convicted of those crimes. 
Some crimes require greater periods of rehabilitation because of their 
seriousness than others. In his memorandum decision, Judge Croft states 
that under Utah law some jail sentences cannot exceed ninety days, 
as for a Class C misdemeanor, "and a probationary period of 
such short duration hardly serves any useful purpose." However, more 
insight into Judge Croft's conclusion may be gained by looking at some 
crimes which are Class C misdemeanors. 
Under Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-106 (as amended 1973), 
harassment is a Class C misdemeanor; under §76-6-106, Criminal 
Mischief where damage is below $250 is a Class C misdemeanor; under 
76-6-206, Criminal Trespass of a non-dwelling is a Class C misdemeanor. 
The point is simply that our legislature has determined that criminal 
conduct in those cases is less serious than in others, therefore, the 
-11-
penalties are less serious. Although it may be argued that 
three months probation may not be long enough to rehabilitate a person 
convicted of Harassment, it may also be argued that three months 
in jail may not be long enough to rehabilitate or punish such person 
either. After three months in jail, the offender may repeat his 
offense or commit another offense proving that three months was 
not long enough. Could it then be argued that the sentencing judge 
should have been able to sentence the offender for a longer period, 
despite the legislative recognition of the low level of seriousness 
of such offense? Appellant thinks not and asks this court to conclude 
that any court's sentencing power is guided by the legislature and not 
open to interpretation by each individual judge, whether that 
judge is considering imprisonment or probation. 
As to the second reason for Judge Croftfs denial of appellant's 
motion to dismiss, appellant feels that the preceding discussion 
adequately represents his view on the issue. Appellant would 
additionally point out to the Court that our notions of Due Process 
of Law require that a man be punished only for the crime he has been 
convicted of. Judge Croft seems to imply that a defendant should be 
punished for having been orginally charged with an offense greater than 
he is eventually convicted of. The implication is that a judge 
may be hesitant to give probation in plea-bargained cases if he is 
limited by the probation period in the lesser offense rather than 
being able to give the defendant the probation period which would 
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have been given if he had plead to the greater offense. Since a 
defendant is presumed innocent at all stages of a criminal 
proceeding prior to conviction, why should he be punished for an 
offense he was never convicted of? As this Court well knows, 
numerous considerations are involved in plea-bargaining, not the least 
of which is that prosecutors sometimes overcharge cases hoping to 
bring pressure upon a defendant to plead guilty to the crime he is 
really guilty of, and which carries a lesser penalty than the 
original charge. In such cases, the legislative determination as to 
the seriousness of the lesser offense should control a judge's 
power to sentence,both for imprisonment and probation. 
In response to the point that judges may not accept plea 
bargains if the probationary period is limited to the period 
of imprisonment of the lesser offense, appellant would argue that 
if the court has that much concern then perhaps it should not accept 
the plea to a lesser offense anyway. 
Although appellant understands Judge Croft's concern, appellant 
believes that the interpretation he suggests would best serve the 
legislative intent and the concept of Due Process of Law as discussed 
in Point II of this brief. 
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POINT II 
THE UTAH LEGISLATURE INTENDED THAT THERE BE PROPORTIONATE 
LIMITS ON PROBATION POWERS OF UTAH COURTS: 
As has been seen, Utah Code Annotated §77-35-17 (1953) gives 
the courts power to place a defendant on probation "for such period of 
time as the court shall determine11; but it is the position of appellant 
that this phraseology was not intended to give courts unlimited juris-
diction over a probationer's liberty. Appellant alleges that whatever 
period of time is involved must be consistent with other law on the 
subject. He, therefore, urges this Court to adopt the more reasonable 
interpretation that the legislature intended to allow for a probationary 
period consistent with the Utah Criminal Code, and an individual's 
right to Due Process of Law under the Constitutions of the United 
States and the State of Utah, by limiting a Court's jurisdiction for 
probationary periods. 
Jurisdiction is a common-law creature expressly embodied 
in both the United States and Utah Constitutions. The authority 
of District Courts in Utah flows from the jurisdiction granted them 
by the State Constitution^ and legislative enactments in harmony 
with such grants of power. See Rocky Ford Canal Co. v. Cox, Judge, 
92 U. 148, 59 P. 2d 935 (1936). 
It is clear that the legislature has the power to prescribe 
and define the forum in which a civil or criminal matter must be 
commenced and therefore to set limitations on the jurisdiction of 
3. Art. VIII Sec. 7, Constitution of Utah 
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District Courts.^ In fact, the legislative power to prescribe 
penalties for crimes necessarily requires a maximum period of 
incarceration for such crimes whether the sentences are determinate 
or indeterminate. 
Appellant contends that it is a matter of Constitutional 
doctrine that the legislature provide jurisdictional limits for 
probation or parole just as it provides limits for incarceration. 
In fact, the Utah legislature, in adopting a complete revision of 
Utah's criminal code which was effective July 1, 1973, adopted a statute 
which clearly establishes the intent of the legislature to 
jurisdictionally limit periods of probation for criminal offenses. 
Utah Code Annotated §76-3-201 (as amended 1973) provides: 
11
 (1) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court 
may sentence a person adjudged guilty of an offense to any 
one of the following sentences or combination of such sentences: 
(a) to pay a fine; or 
(b) to removal from and/or disqualification of public or 
private office; or 
(c) to probation; or 
(d) to imprisonment; or 
(e) to death." 
(emphasis added) 
It would appear that it is the declared policy of the 
legislature to prescribe jurisdictional limits for probation; and 
further that such limitations appear within that chapter (Chapter 3, 
Punishments). Utah Code Annotated §77-35-17 (1953) appears as 
4. State v. Johnson, 100 U. 316, 114 P.2d 1034 (1941) 
5. Utah Code Annotated §76-3-203-206, (as amended 1973). 
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part of the Code of Criminal Procedure which is found in 
an entirely different Title (let alone chapter) than §76-3-201, 
which is part of Utah's Criminal Code. Since that Section 
was enacted in 1953, it would seem that the 1973 provision 
(76-3-201) was intended by the legislature to be controlling on the 
question of jurisdictional limitations on a court's power to 
determine time periods for probation in criminal cases. This 
argument is even more persuasive when considered from the point of 
view that since §77-35-17 allows probation lffor such period of time 
as the court shall determine11 the legislature, due to the absence 
of specific jurisdictional standards, intended that that period 
of time be consistent with the limitations imposed by other relevant 
statutes and that those limitations are the maximum period of time 
to which a defendant may be sentenced to incarceration (now under 
Chapter 3 of the Criminal Code). 
It seems logical to conclude that the legislature intended 
(through 76-3-201) to place limitations on the period of time for 
which a defendant may be placed on probation, but since Chapter 3 does 
not specifically delineate such limitations, the legislature must 
have intended the maximum terms of imprisonment to also be maximum 
terms for probation. 
Such reasoning would be consistent with the overall policy 
of Utah's Criminal Code expressed in Utah Code Annotated §76-1-104 
(as amended 1975) : 
^ The provisions of this code shall be construed in accordance 
with these general purposes: . . . (3) Prescribe penalties 
which are proportionate to the seriousness of offenses and whicl 
permit recognition or difference in rehabilitation possibilitie 
among individual offenders." 
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It would seem clear that if the legislature determined for 
I 
example, that theft of property under $100.00 was only serious 
enough to warrant imprisonment for six months, that any period of 
probation provided in lieu of imprisonment snould not be any longer. 
If a serious felony is committed, it seems logical that the period 
of probation should be proportionate to the period of incarceration. 
If the legislature determines that aggravated assault requires 
a 0-5 year sentence of imprisonment, the seriousness of that offense 
also requires a longer period of probation than in a less serious 
theft case, if probation is granted in lieu o|j 
It seems to be a fact of the criminal! 
probation, so often construed as a "privilege 
|f imprisonment, 
justice system that 
" is in fact to some 
extent, a penalty. The limitations on one's jprivacy and freedom 
of movement and association are such that one is clearly "penalized" 
for one's criminal conduct even through not imprisoned, and this 
is certainly the way it should be. This view was supported by 
Justice Crockett in Brimhall v. Turner, 28 Utilj 2d 321, 502 P.2d 115 
(1972): 
"Even though he has been placed on parole, he is deemed 
to be actually serving the sentence imposed, and is in a 
sense in the extended custody of prison authorities." 
502 P.2d at 117. 
Although a petitioner's parole status Iwas the subject of that 
appeal, the principle certainly can be relateq to the status of probatiot 
as well. A defendant on probation is, in a sdnse, in the extended 
custody of the Court. He is required as a condition of probation 
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to follow the instructions of his probation officer. Among other 
things those instructions uniformly include: 
(a) Maintaining employment; 
(b) Notifying probation officer of change of address; 
(c) Getting permission of probation officer to leave the 
state or to marry; 
(d) Not associating with known felons. 
No one, least of all appellant, can argue that such restrictions 
are too severe or unnecessary where one has been convicted of a crime 
and is on probation in lieu of total loss of his liberty. Appellant 
simply points out these restrictions to remind the court that 
probation is, in and of itself, to some extent a penalty. Is it 
not logical to conclude then, that the stated legislative purpose 
of prescribing penalties which are proportionate to the seriousness 
of offenses requires the interpretation that maximum terms of 
imprisonment were also intended to be maximum terms for probation? 
That a defendant has certain rights, as well as responsibilities 
while on probation, is a concept that has been established through a 
long line of Utah Supreme Court cases. The landmark case on the 
issue was State v. Zolantakis, 70 Utah 296, 25 P. 1044 (1927). In a 
scholarly and frequently quoted opinion, Justice Elias Hansen writing 
for the majority said: 
"The purpose of the law permitting the suspension of sentence 
is clearly reformatory. If those who are to be reformed 
cannot implicitly rely upon promises or orders contained 
in the suspension of sentence, then we may well expect 
the law to fail in its purpose. Reformation can certainly 
best be accomplished by fair, consistent, and straighforward 
treatment of the person sought to be reformed.ff 
259 P. at 1046. 
This Court then, announced as early as 1927 that the 
legal concept of probation is not to be treated lightly 
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in this State. In fact, this opinion, decided 45 years prior to the 
heralded United States Supreme Court case of Morrisey v. Brewer, 
408 U.S. 471, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484, 92 S. Ct. 2593 (1972) established 
the principle that a probationer was entitled to Due Process of Law 
before his probation could be revoked, and tqat such Due Process 
required: 
n
. . .a hearing upon the question of whether or not he has 
complied with the conditions imposed; that such hearing must 
be according to some well recognized and established 
rules of judicial procedure; that defendant is entitled 
to have filed either an affidavit, motion or other written 
pleading setting forth the facts relied upon for a 
revocation of the suspension of sentence; that the defendant 
should be given an opportunity to answer or plead to the 
charge made; that a hearing should be had upon the issues 
stated; and that the defendant as wel|L as the state be 
given the right of cross-examination. *' 
259 P. at 1047. 
Justice Hansen made crystal clear thi^ Court's attitude 
toward those requirements when he concluded tljie point by declaring: 
,fIf we are correct in our conclusion that the defendant 
has a vested right to his personal liberty during 
good behavior when so ordered without I reservation in the 
original sentence, any proceeding failing in these 
essentials is error." 259 P. at 1047. 
Lawyers and judges alike have agreed that the United States 
Supreme Court's holding in Morrissey in 1972 \^ as a step forward in 
the administration of the American concept of Constitutional justice. 
But isn't it interesting that the Utah Supreme Court recognized, the 
same rights for probationers at a time when most states allowed 
probation revocations at the whim and caprice |of the sentencing 
judge? 
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This high regard for the purpose and fairness of the very 
concept of probation has been reiterated in numerous Utah Supreme 
Court decisions through the years. See Thompson v. Harris, Warden, 
106 Utah 32, 144 P.2d 761 at 767 (1943); Williams v. Harris, Warden, 
106 Utah 387, 149 P.2d 640 at 642 (1944); State v. Fedder, 1 Utah 
2d 117, 262 P.2d 753 (1953); Baine v. Beckstead, 10 Ut. 2d 4, 347 P.2d 
554 (1959); State v. Eichler, 25 Ut. 2d 421, 483 P.2d 887 (1971); 
Brimhall v. Turner, 28 Ut. 2d 321, 502 P.2d 116 (1972). 
In the Brimhall case, supra, the Utah Supreme Court expanded 
the due process requirements of Zolantakis in reviewing a parole 
revocation attacked by virtue of a habeas corpus proceeding. 
Writing for the majority, Justice Crockett said: 
11
 . . . (W)e acknowledge the mere fact that there has been 
an accusation of crime should give rise to no presumption 
adverse to plaintiff." 502 P.2d at 117. 
Although Zolantakis and the cases following implied that a 
probationer should be afforded the presumption of innocence when 
accused of a new violation of law, Justice Crockett's pronouncement 
was the first express declaration of this important principle. Thus, 
^through a long series of cases, this Court has recognized that probatior 
have rights as well as responsibilities. It seems logical to conclude 
that the state legislature intended to follow these forward-looking 
--"due process concepts by limiting the period of probation to the 
maximum period of imprisonment provided for in the statute describing 
a crime, whether that statute is found in Utah's Criminal Code, it's 
Motor Vehicle Act, or its Controlled Substances Act. 
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CONCLUSION 
It seems to be such a small and logical step for this 
Court to conclude that where there is no spedific legislative 
pronouncement as to the length of a probationary period, that justice 
and fairness dictate that the maximum period 
as the maximum period of probation also. By 
of imprisonment be control! 
drawing such a conclusion, 
this Court would be following the wise pronouncement of policy in 
probation cases as expounded by Justice Hansen almost 50 years ago 
when he said; 
"Reformation can certainly best be accomplished by fair, 
consistent and straightforward treatment of the person 
sought to be reformed." 9 P. at 1046 
being treated consistently 
Would it not be fair to allow a persoii convicted of a crime 
I 
to know that the maximum limit of his period of probation will be no 
longer than that of anyone else convicted of the same crime? Wouldn't 
it remove the bitterness and counterproductive attitude that sometimes 
develops when a person can see that he is not 
with others in his same circumstance? Would lit not be straightforward 
for the law to adequately inform a defendant that he will be required 
to undergo the severe limitations probation often requires for a 
set and established period of time; a period wnosemaximum is dictated 
by the legislature and not the sometimes inexapt evaluation of the 
judge who sentences him? 
Respectfully submitted, 
LARKY R./pLLEit 
Attorney £or Appellant 
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APPENDIX "A" 
In the District Court of the Third Judicial District, 
in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
JULIETTE HARRIS 
Plaintiff 
ENTERED ORDER 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 187877 
DEWEY Fl LLIS DATED July 18, 1969 
Defendant 
M E R R I L L C . F A U X , JUDGE 
The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus comes 
now on regularly before the Court for hearing. 
The Plaintiff appearing in person and being 
represented by John O'Connell as co u n s e l . 
The Defendant being represented by Clinton 
Balmforth as c o u n s e l . Whereupon, said Writ 
is argued to the Court by respective counsel and 
submitted. The Court having considered and 
now being fully advised in the premises 
orders said Writ be and the same is hereby 
granted. 
*TATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE }S* 
By 
*S CLEi 
' \ - sX> 
D E P U T V 
/ s / Hal Rueckert 
Depu ty Clerk 
APPENDIX "B" 
•) c i . r: v - t 
DAVID !\". °OWM 
Attorn:--'' for Petitioner 
263 South CecondEast 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111 
Telephone: 350-3785 
IN T'.TE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TIfIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, 
IN AND FOR, SALT LAKE COUNTY,! STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLES FR/NIKLIN HIMES, 
Petitioner, 
-vs-
DELNIAR LARSON, 
Re'.pore Ait, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 188585 
This matter came on regularly for hearing on the 20th day of August, 
1969, at 9:00 A. M. The petitioner was present and was represented by 
Counsel Davie -' ••!. Bown, Attorney at Law; thi respondent was not present 
out was repr-e.-ented by Paul Van Dam, Assistant County Attorney for 
Salt Lake County; evidence was taken and argjiments were heard and based 
:hereon the Court makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the allegations contained in paragraphs one through eight of 
Petitioner1;; petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus are true as alleged. 
That the Utah Supreme Court in Stifce vs. Fair, 42d 
P2d J19^9) held the violation of Sec. 
58-lCa-3e, Utah-Code Annotate.!, (1953), to bfe a simple misdemeanor. 
r r r-n j>om the abovo R i n d i n g : of F a r t Lhei Cour t make:; the 
Eoliov 
CeeiCLUSIONG Of LAW 
•tit.:oner1:; restraint is illegal forj 
R) The "one year in jaiT'condi 
the following reasons: 
:ion for probation exceeds 
the ma:dr'.am penalty under law for the crime charged. 
(b) The sentencing Court was without jurisdiction to 
further extend probation. 
Dated this $ ^ £ day of September, 1969. 
BY THE COURT: 
_ ^
 C
- t ^ ^ C ^ 
ATTEST -- HONORABLE GORDON R HALL 
v. s n ^ A N s .
 D i s t r i c t court Judge 
<T \ ( ) *v*utv Clerk 
I, THE UNDERSIGNED, CLERK OP THE WSTmCT 
COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH, DO HSRE3Y 
CERTIFY THAT THE ANNEXED AND FOREGOING IS A 
TRUE AND FULL COPY OF AN ORIGINAL DOCUMENT CM 
FILE IN MY OFFICE AS SUCH CLERK. 
WITNESS MY HAND ANO SEAL OF SAID COURT 
THIS .oXUi3AY OF i ^ idLL^L . -« . 19„Xksw 
W. ST6RUNG EVANS, CLERt^
 { ^ *, 
BY X^\\X(>^, ° ^ y ^ t L - , . DEPUIY Q 
APPENDIX "C 
1ACK W. Kl'NKI.' R 
Salt Lake Legal IX fender Association 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
343 South Six'Li ;,,'•;: 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84102 
Telephone: ^32-5444 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFRCG 
Salt Ulro County, Utoli 
JUN *i 1975 
V. Slfihnj Ev.m, C'U.k )>(f Ql,t. Court 
f S ] Dopufy Clvrl 
IN Tin: DISTRICT COURT OF THE TIIIflD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELIZABETH ANNE SMITH, 
Petitioner, 
-vs-
SALT LAKE CITY COURT AND 
ROBERT C. GIBSON, JUDGE 
Respondents. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW 
Civil No. 227320 
regularly for hearing on the 
r was present and was repre-
aw; the respondent was not 
The above entitled matter having come on 
22nd day of May. l '^5, at 9:00 A.M. the petitionei
sented by Counsel lack W. Kunkler. Attorney at L 
present but was represented by Donald Sawaya, assistant County Attorney 
for Salt Lake Conn ty: evidence was taken and arguments were heard and 
based thereon the Court makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the allegations contained in paragraphs one through five, 
and paragraphs seven, sixteen, seventeen, eighteen, nineteen and twenty-five 
of Petitioner's petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 
Therefore, from the above Findings of Factf the Court makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. -Petitioner's restraint is illegal for the Jfol lowing reasons-
fa) A person who pleads guilty or is convicted of a crime may 
not be placed on probation for a period of time in tbcccss of the period of 
maximum incarccran'on allowable \ov that offense,! and 
(b). U:e petitioner plead guilty to a cijime for which the maximum 
are true as alleged. 
incarceration allowable was six months, and hence the maximum period for 
which she could be placed on probation was six months, and 
(c). The Salt Lake City Court having placed the petitioner on 
probation November 27, 1973 that Court lost all jurisdiction over the pe-
titioner six months later on May 27, 1974, and 
(d). The probation the petitioner is presently on in Case No. 
57788 is therefore invalid and without force of law. 
HONORABLE STEWART M. HANSON, SR. 
ATTEST 
VV. STERLING EVANS 
~~**~ pepoty Ctork 
Mailed a cony of the foregoing to the County Attorney, the City Court 
Clerk, Judge Robert C. Gibson, and Misdemeanant Probation on the / 
dav of |unt\ 1975. . 
STATE OF U T A H 
3UNTY O - SALT 
\, T H * Mf' i 'S.RSiGNSD, CLER^K 6 F T H E DISTRICT 
r o ^ - r c:~ :A: .T \MJ\ COUNTY; UTAH, DO HEREBV 
cE»rr;«>' - • T r»is .•NNEXED AND FOREGOING IS 
A T » ! ~ t ^ C ••o- .L CO^Y OF AN ORIGINAL DOCU; 
JMgfcT Cr. . . . - ;N MY O F F I C E AS SUCH CLERK. 
W I T N S A a \LY HAND A N D 3EAL OF SAID COURT 
THIS -£j DAY OF ^'^< V \ U H L 
)/& STERLING EVANS, CLERK^ N O 
^ 
